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Since when, how, and why have sociologists discussed human rights in their work? In 
which forms of theoretical and empirical inquiry have such investigations been conducted, 
and what are some of their consequences for the praxis of sociology as well as for our 
understanding of human rights? We focus on the manner in which sociologists have 
conceptualized human rights and approached the topic from a number of analytical 
perspectives. In general, human rights have only recently begun to move sociologists in any 
noteworthy degree. This paper traces the difficult birth of a sociology of human rights 
relative to the place of the notion of rights in the sociology of law. This paper also ponders 
on the enthusiastic turn towards human rights in more recent times and criticizes some the 
reasons for this generous embrace of human rights. This critique is intended to enable 
rather than impede a truly sociological sociology of (human) rights. 
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Introduction
In recent decades, the topic of human rights has taken on a more 
prominent role than ever in the discipline of sociology. What are the 
conditions and consequences of this adoption into sociology of a subject 
matter that for the better part of the development of the discipline was absent 
from its core as well as its periphery? In this paper, we will focus on some 
lessons for the sociology of human rights from the viewpoint of the sociology 
of law and the treatment, in this specialty area, of rights and human rights. 
We begin our observations by briefly and no doubt incompletely 
reviewing certain key issues in the contemporary sociological literature on 
human rights, especially focusing on the programmatic statements that have 
been formulated in order to make sense of the newly emerging specialty of 
the sociology of human rights. Such a programmatic framework is necessary 
for research and additionally, one might hope and suspect, could contribute 
alongside of other disciplinary approaches to the study of human rights. We 
then confront the key elements of the sociological human rights program 
with insights from the sociology of law. Finally, we extend the discussion on 
the proper role of sociological knowledge, which underlie much of the 
sociological debate on human rights, in order to formulate some thoughts on 
the prospects for a veritable sociology of human rights. 
A Sociology of the Sociology of Human Rights 
It will be useful to clarify what it is we are discussing when evaluating 
the development and state of the sociology of human rights in order to 
highlight some of the problems and prospects identified with the sociological 
study of human rights as they have been articulated by the practitioners of 
this specialty. This review of the sociology of human rights cannot be said to 
be based on a well-developed expertise within this growing area of thought. 
Yet, focusing on certain influential programmatic statements on the 
sociology of human rights, certain central themes may nonetheless be 
detected that can be validly addressed from the viewpoint of the sociology of 
law. 
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The Sociological Tradition 
In almost all programmatic statements about the sociology of human 
rights, the classical tradition of sociology is seen as generally inhospitable 
towards the adoption of human rights as a sociological subject matter (see 
Morris 2006). Human rights sociologists such as Bryan Turner (1993, 2006, 
2009) and Gideon Sjoberg (Sjoberg et al. 2001; Vaughan and Sjoberg 1986) 
have argued that the classical social theorists declined to adopt rights as a 
legitimate area of study. This traditional resistance against taking up human 
rights in sociology is held to result from a purported positivistic tendency 
which would have been imbedded in sociology from the very start. By 
example, Bryan Turner (1993) argues that Emile Durkheim approached law 
and rights from a positivistic standpoint, focusing on legal norms as social 
facts, and thus demarcating the differing tasks of philosophy and sociology. 
Notions of just and unjust law and rights could in these terms only be 
approached as a matter of (dys)functionality. Turner criticizes Max Weber’s 
work along similar lines, as revealing a positivistic tendency to view modern 
law as a rationalized system that dispenses with questions on the universally 
valid normative foundations of law. Weber’s methodological orientation of 
value-freedom is also said to hinder the study of human rights. 
Sociologists of human rights have likewise criticized the writings of Karl 
Marx, despite that body of work’s clear philosophical orientations. The 
reasons for concern are different than in the cases that are made against 
Durkheim and Weber. Rather than challenging Marx’s work with positivism, 
it is the Marxian critique of human rights that is being criticized. Marx 
argued that human rights, such as those expressed during the French 
Revolution, were essentially individual liberty rights rather than social 
equality rights. The discourse on human rights, according to Marx, operates 
as a facade to mask concrete conditions of economic inequality. Thus, as 
Anthony Woodiwiss (2009) suggests, Marx reduces human rights to their 
purported role in capitalist social life. Yet, while ignoring the value of (the 
study of) rights in terms of an economic-deterministic model, it can be 
learned from Marx that the notion of human rights is a construct that is 
produced through social relations. For Marx, naturally, these rights are rights 
of freedom that not only do not entail, but explicitly run contrary to, social 
rights of equality, thus even exacerbating conditions of (economic) inequality. 
Related to the Marxian critique, R.W. Connel (1995) has argued that the 
hesitancy of sociology to engage in the study of human rights is due to the 
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conflict between sociology’s holistic approach and the liberal individualism 
associated with the discourse on rights. 
Institutionalized Human Rights
The liberal reading of rights, which sociologists of human rights argue to 
be one of the obstacles towards the development of a sociology of human 
rights, is already a specific interpretation and a concrete realization of rights 
in (Western) societies. Sociologists of human rights therefore suggest, as does 
Woodiwiss (2009), that it needs to be taken seriously that human rights and 
the discourse(s) on human rights take place within a specific socio-historical 
context. Rights always exist socially as concrete claims and institutionalized 
measures. Importantly, sociologists of human rights argue, these 
institutionalizations of human rights need not be restricted to legal norms. In 
fact, with respect to the legal institutionalization of human rights, sociologists 
of human rights often argue against the restricted idea that human rights 
must relate to legal protections. Law becomes a suspect category in the 
sociological discourse on human rights. For this reason, it can be assumed, 
Woodiwiss (2009) mentions the work of H.L.A. Hart as among the first 
explicitly formulated sociological perspectives of human rights. Yet, 
Woodiwiss argues, Hart developed a human rights approach that was based 
on a legal-positivistic framework. 
Even some experts in the sociology of law have warned against certain 
perspectives on the legality of human rights. John Hagan and Ron Levi 
(2007) argue that when a scholarly approach is restricted to the institutional 
boundaries of human rights law, there is a danger of the analysis becoming 
confined to a technical arena of jurisprudence, which is not conducive to 
questions of substantive human rights justice. The language of law then 
becomes the predominant or even the exclusive means to communicate 
about human rights and human rights violations, not the needs and 
perceptions of those to whom human rights apply. As a result, it would 
become difficult to discuss human rights violations separate from law and the 
legal processes through which they are enforced. 
As a correlate to the legality of human rights, other human rights 
sociologists have related human rights with the notion of citizenship. Bryan 
Turner (1993), most clearly, argues that citizenship has served as a substitute 
for the study of human rights. This substitution, however, has only displaced 
the problem of taking rights seriously in sociology because citizenship always 
involves rights. Besides, the human rights of the global era move beyond 
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citizenship, because citizenship remains bound to nation-states. Turner 
(1993) therefore argues in favor of a perspective that recognizes the 
institutionalization of human rights as a central component of globalization, 
thus becoming more and more a fact of social life, whereby human rights are 
defined as (social) claims for institutionalized protection. Likewise shifting 
the focus away from (nation-state) law and citizenship, Connell (1995) treats 
rights in terms of the mobilization of rights in social movements. 
The Boundaries of Sociology (as Practice)  
Analyzing the slow development of the sociology of human rights, 
Margaret Somers and Christopher Roberts (2008) view the obstacles broader 
than the intellectual foundations of sociology and also consider the position 
and ideal role of sociology as a social practice. Thus, they argue that 
sociologists have avoided human rights because of a resistance to 
philosophical questions. In social research, consequently, human rights are 
often dispensed with in favor of citizenship studies. As another impediment, 
finally, human rights present a conceptual problem in terms of finding a 
widely agreed upon definition. 
Somers and Roberts go a step further and in a different direction than 
Bryan Turner and other human rights sociologists by arguing that a sociology 
of human rights should entail a transcending, negotiating, or deconstructing 
of the obstacles of social sciences resistance to foundationalism and 
normativity. Additionally, the conflict between the universality and 
abstractness of rights, on the one hand, and the social and institutional 
characteristics of citizenship, on the other, must be overcome, as must the 
hierarchical privileging of civil and political rights over socioeconomic rights. 
Somers and Roberts thus discuss more fundamentally the professional 
boundaries and role of sociology. They suggest that a sociology of human 
rights need not be afraid to take up normative issues into its analysis. From a 
similar viewpoint, Gideon Sjoberg and colleagues argue that a sociological 
focus on the moral order, as a social reality, implies that moral inquiry in 
sociology is justified (Sjoberg et al. 2001). While sociologists typically have 
trouble approaching universal concepts, the authors argue, applying such 
universal principles to empirical situations would be illuminating. 
From this review it is clear that sociologists of human rights have 
criticized the classical tradition of sociology because of its presumed 
impotence to study rights. As a more specific component of this critique, a 
focus on the legal institutionalization of human rights is seen as imposing an 
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unwarranted constraint on the sociological study of human rights. We will 
argue that this dual critique is misplaced and suggest that sociology, in 
general, and the sociology of law, in particular, are the victims of a misguided 
criticisms by sociologists of human rights. Our arguments relate to both the 
sociology of law as it has emanated from the classics as well as to the broader 
role sociology should play, both intellectually as well as socially. 
(Human) Rights: Lessons from the Sociology of Law
The first author of this paper has recently reviewed the history and 
systematics of the sociology of law in the form of a book-length study 
(Deflem 2008). Although this work does not offer a complete review of all 
developments in this sociological specialty, the study was comprehensively 
aimed at laying bare the intellectual and institutional contours of the 
sociological study of law. Whatever the merits of the work, it is striking to 
observe that there are only three mentions of human rights in the book. 
Additionally telling is the fact that the term rights was mentioned well over 
100 times. A brief discussion of these usages of human rights and rights in 
the sociology of law may reveal some essential characteristics of both the 
realizations and limitations of the development of a sociology of human 
rights from within the specialty of the sociology of law. 
Human Rights and Law 
In the sociology of law, the theme of human rights is discussed exclusively 
with respect to the globalization of law and the internationalization of law and 
justice. In her work on the development of the global prohibition regime 
against female genital cutting, for example, Elizabeth Heger Boyle (2002) 
observes that there are important variations in the processes whereby 
national legislations have been passed and, additionally, what the impact is of 
these laws on genital-cutting practices, despite the fact that the practice has in 
recent years universally been outlawed. Boyle argues that the movement to 
prohibit female genital cutting has been motivated by concerns over health, 
gender equality, violence against women and children, and human rights. 
In the work of sociologist John Hagan, the theme of human rights is 
approached in terms of the development of an international criminal court 
(Hagan, Schoenfeld, and Palloni 2006). Hagan argues that the prospects of 
such a globally recognized court can rely on a new global consensus on 
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norms, especially with respect to human rights. Several concrete legal 
developments can be seen as institutionalizations of such a discourse. The 
successful operation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia shows that advances in a global spread of the rule of law may be 
possible as part of a trend towards the global diffusion of democratic norms 
and human rights. However, the prospects of a global court are not favorable 
in view of the inability (or refusal) of the international community to 
intervene in certain conflicts involving genocide and war crimes (e.g., 
Darfur). Additionally hindering the effective installation and implementation 
of a global legal regime is the refusal of some partners in the world 
community, especially those politically and economically strong nations 
whose positions can have ripple effects into other national contexts. There 
still exists today this thing called national sovereignty. 
In the context of the sociology of law, mention should finally also be 
made of the fact that the globalization of law (as globalization in general) is 
often understood in highly normative terms which relate closely to a likewise 
normative discourse on human rights. Heinz Klug (2005), for instance, 
argues in favor of an emerging field of transnational human rights on the 
basis of an integration of the domains of (international) human rights, 
humanitarian law, and constitutional rights. Underlying this approach is a 
conception of law as being inescapably close related to normative concerns, 
whereby the globalization of law, specifically, is intimately tied to a global 
discourse on rights, which becomes almost unavoidably connected to human 
rights. 
Law and Rights 
In stark contrast with the underdeveloped discussions of human rights 
in the sociology of law stands a very elaborate tradition of a rights discourse 
and related research in this sociological specialty field. Restricting this 
discussion to some of the most poignant discussions of rights in the sociology 
of law, both classic and modern, some of the key characteristics of this 
tradition can here be reviewed. 
While classical sociology was born out of the dual traditions of social 
philosophy (Europe) and social policy (United States) and from there sought 
to itself as an academic enterprise, there did not occur an expulsion of rights 
from the classical sociological discourse. Quite to the contrary, for classical 
sociology was deeply invested in seeing to contribute to the multiple 
discourses on rights on the basis of the accomplishments of sociological 
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scholarship. Various classical scholars can be mentioned in this respect. 
William Graham Sumner, for instance, in his 1906 book Folkways argued that 
the customs of a society can turn into mores that become endowed with 
sanctions (Sumner 1906). Embedded within these mores are rights, which 
Sumner conceives as ethical conceptions of justice. Importantly, Sumner 
argues that mores can also develop into laws, yet that laws can never fully or 
adequately express rights.
While other examples can be mentioned of classical scholars discussing 
rights within a scholarly framework (e.g., Ferdinand Tönnies, see Deflem 
2008), the work of Emile Durkheim stands at the apex of the classical 
sociology of rights. Particularly relevant in this respect are Durkheim’s 
lectures on professional ethics and civic morals (Durkheim 1900). In this 
series of lectures, Durkheim devoted special attention to the role of the state 
in the creation of rights (see Deflem 2008). 
Durkheim conceives of moral and juridical facts as the observable 
expressions of morals and rights. In contemporary (organic) society, 
Durkheim argues, crimes against the person and against personal property 
arouse the greatest resentment and receive the harshest sanction because they 
violate a morality that places the qualities of the individual above all else. The 
rules concerning crimes against the person and against property extend 
beyond the boundaries of any particular society. 
By example, Durkheim analyzes the evolution and nature of property 
rights as the basis for a sociological theory of contract and contract law. 
Private property, he maintains, is a right to possession that is exclusive, at 
least towards other individuals, as in some circumstances the state may still 
claim certain rights. The basis of this private property right is not the thing 
that is owned nor the sacred or divine blessing it has received, but society as 
such, for society endows property with an exclusive right. The social basis of 
this right is articulated in the contract. 
The modern sociology of law has been more ambivalent towards a 
discussion of rights. In fact, most analyses on rights in the multidisciplinary 
field of law and society studies have taken place, and continue to take place, 
in jurisprudence and in the philosophy of law, not in the more specialized 
field of legal sociology. Looking at discussions on rights in the contemporary 
sociology of law of the past few decades, it is striking that the most 
conspicuous and intellectually challenging contribution has come from 
Jürgen Habermas, from a scholar, in other words, who essentially merges 
philosophical and sociological perspectives. In his historical work on the 
evolution of the juridification of rights, Habermas (1981) analyzes the 
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development of welfare law in the context of the (European) welfare state. It is 
the gradual unfolding of individual and social rights in this development that 
is of special interest to the theme of this paper. 
Historically, Habermas argues, four waves of juridification can be 
described. First, in the traditional bourgeois states of the absolutist regimes in 
Europe, the expansion of the capitalist economy was accompanied by the 
development of civil laws that grant liberal freedom rights and obligations to 
private persons engaged in contractual relations on the market. Second, with 
the development of constitutional states, the private rights of citizens to life, 
liberty, and property are constitutionally guaranteed over and against the 
political sovereign, who is now bound by law to not interfere with these 
rights. The right to participate in government is granted during a third 
juridification wave when, under the influence of the French Revolution, 
democratic constitutional states develop and political participation rights are 
granted in the form of an expansion of voting rights. Finally, during the 
twentieth century, the democratic welfare state develops and welfare 
regulations bridle the workings of the free-market system in order to ensure a 
modicum of economic equality.
Importantly, Habermas’s perspective on the evolution of (legally 
guaranteed) rights lays bare the development of individual (freedom) and 
social (equality) rights. This co-existence of rights is basic to, and indeed 
imbedded within, human rights, even when, or at least to the extent that, the 
discourse of human rights does not recognize this fundamental conflict. 
Whatever the specific merits of the sociological treatment of rights, it is 
clear that rights have de facto received attention in sociology in a way that is 
not restricted to any so-called positivistic conception of sociology. The 
sociology of law has devoted attention — a decidedly sociological attention 
— to the study of rights within a broader framework of study oriented to the 
analysis of law. It is a mere function of the thematic orientation of the 
sociology of law that this understanding of rights always relates to law. More 
critically, from the viewpoint of building a sociology of human rights, the 
sociology of law shows that a sociology of rights is possible. 
What sociologists of human rights in their criticisms fundamentally 
regret, we suspect, is not any inability on the part of sociology to study rights, 
and hence to study human rights (as rights), but the simple fact that 
sociology cannot by virtue of its disciplinary boundaries engage in 
philosophical ways to the analysis of (human) rights. Sociologists of human 
rights appear to regret to be sociologists. Their problem is not that sociology 
is not more than sociology but that sociology cannot be more than sociology. 
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This understanding of the possibilities of a sociology of human rights relates, 
more broadly, to the fundamental tasks of sociology. 
The Rights (and Obligations) of Sociology 
The famous description by C. Wright Mills on the various roles of the 
sociologist remains one of the most explicit formulations of the rights (and 
duties) of the sociological profession. Mills (1959) differentiates the 
philosopher-king from the royal advisor and the social-science scholar 
guided by the sociological imagination. The philosopher-king represents the 
model of the social scientist who takes full command of the political agenda 
on the basis of acquired expertise and knowledge. The royal advisor 
bureaucratically recommends the most efficient means for whatever ends 
that are determined by the king. And in the role Mills advocates, finally, the 
sociologist unites private troubles and public issues and is directed at kings 
and publics alike. It is the role of this sociologist inspired by the sociological 
imagination that is also favored by many sociologists of human rights and 
that, in American sociology, has recently been adopted and promoted under 
the banner of so-called public sociology. 
Human Rights Sociology as Public Sociology?
The background of the curious development of public sociology need 
not entertain us here (see Deflem 2004, 2007). What is striking and relevant 
in the context of this paper is that many of the comments made by public 
sociology, especially concerning their discontents about sociology as it exists, 
harmonize with the criticisms raised by sociologists of human rights against 
traditional sociology. Public sociology “defines, promotes and informs public 
debate about class and racial inequalities, new gender regimes, environmental 
degradation, multiculturalism, technological revolutions, market 
fundamentalism, and state and non-state violence” (cited in Deflem 2007). 
Public sociologists not only study these issues; they also seek to “challenge the 
world as we know it, exposing the gap between what is and what could be” 
(ibidem). 
The normative orientation of public sociology is eerily reminiscent of 
some of the pleas made by sociologists of human rights. But there is an 
immediate problem with this perspective because it imposes a dual 
limitation. First, public sociology is limited to specific topics of research and, 
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as we know from some advocates of public sociology, human rights is among 
the favored subject matters (e.g., Blau and Moncada 2007; Burawoy 2006). 
Second, the objectives of public sociology, like many of the programmatic 
proposals of a sociology of human rights, are not merely oriented at analyzing 
the social world; they additionally and importantly seek to challenge the 
world. 
Transgressions of Human Rights Sociology
To the extent that the sociology of human rights is a manifestation of, or 
at least harmonizes with, public sociology, we argue, it is a fractioned and 
perverted sociology. Let us briefly consider some of the indicators of this 
distortion. 
(1) The activism of human rights sociology.
Quoting from the writings of Alasdair MacIntyre, Bryan Turner (2009) 
makes the unwittingly telling comment that MacIntyre put it “brilliantly” 
when he argued against value-freedom in social science by stating that one 
could never argue, from a value-neutral viewpoint, that a political regime 
collapsed because it was unjust or illegitimate. In truth, however, a 
sociological perspective committed to analysis rather than critique reveals 
that a political regime can fail when it is considered unjust or illegitimate. 
Rather than continuing to be immersed in a sociological regret, the sociology 
of human rights should have the courage to become sociological. 
(2) The absolutism of the human rights discourse.
Human rights sociologists typically position themselves as supporters of 
human rights to promote the development of ways to curtail human rights 
violations and find ways to institutionalize human rights protections. But 
who is or who can be against human rights? And if we cannot be against 
human rights, does it imply that we also must, rather than can, accept a 
human rights sociology? The normativity of human rights sociology at the 
least appears to demonize its opponents. A constructionist view instead 
would urge sociologists to focus on the cultural construction of human rights 
and on the social reality of human rights, including its use and violations 
thereof. Abandoning an essentialist understanding of human rights will 
enable an authentic sociology of human rights as much as the expulsion of 
natural law from the history of social thought enabled the development of the 
sociology of law. 
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(3) The krypto-legalism of human rights sociology. 
While critiquing the restricted vision of legalized human rights 
institutionalizations, sociologists of human rights rely on the law as an 
efficient instrument to prevent or respond to human rights violations (e.g., 
Blau and Moncada 2007). This legalistic viewpoint is especially curious in 
light of the ample research that exists in the area of sociology of law and 
criminological sociology that shows the (potential) gap between the 
objectives and the consequences of law as well as the unintended 
consequences of criminalization practices. The understanding of law, 
criminal justice, police, and other legal institutions by human rights 
sociologists — as by many other non-insiders of the field of sociology of law, 
crime, and social control — is profoundly unsociological. Rather than 
assuming that the law is an effective instrument against human rights abuses, 
the discrepancies that may and often do exist between the functions and 
consequences of law must be taken seriously. 
(4) The singularity of rights. 
Rights, it is often remarked in the sociological discourse on human 
rights, necessarily involve a social relationship because rights entail claims 
towards others. The right to be heard and the right to be left alone, for 
instance, entail an appeal that invokes obligations from others. Yet, human 
rights appear to have no such complement in a notion of ‘human obligations.’ 
Developing such a conceptual counterpart, it is to be noted that these 
obligations do not refer to the duty on the part of states and non-state actors 
to respect human rights, but to obligations on the part of all humans towards 
one another as a complement of their human rights. 
(5) The use and abuse of human rights. 
Related to the legalism of human rights sociology, the practitioners of 
the field appear to insufficiently realize that human rights can be abused 
precisely by being advocated. Writing at the beginning of the Reagan era of 
the Cold War, T. R. Young (1981) in this respect astutely observed that 
human rights can be used by any social formation, such as a nation-state, in 
such a way “as to make itself look good in contrast to its chief rival”. This 
abuse of human rights is politically motivated, of course, but it is made 
possible because human rights are formulated in highly abstract terms and 
because human rights entail a variety of rights that need to be weighed. 
Rightly, Young reminds us, human rights can be a weapon in a social conflict. 
Moreover, even at the abstract level, where human rights purport to claim 
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universality, human rights can be conceived in different ways. It is important, 
therefore, for sociologists to unmask the abuse of human rights by specifying 
the historical context in which it takes place. 
Conclusion: Towards a Sociological Sociology of Human Rights 
This discussion on the sociology of human rights takes us back to the 
central question on the objectives of sociology. Sociology, we fundamentally 
argue, cannot be involved in promoting or defining anything other than 
systematically gathered, well-theorized and well-researched, knowledge about 
social life. In the case of human rights, any simplistic intrusion of normative 
questions (back) into sociology is, we suspect, a function of the politicization 
of sociology and a misguided orientation towards the understanding of rights 
(and their violations). For the revolutionary quality of sociology is precisely 
its ability to transcend normative debates to engage in analysis of the existing 
world.
Therefore, we argue that, similar to the sociology of democracy, where 
the best and most sociological work is done on the multiple ways in which 
democratic ideals are violated (Deflem 2008), sociology can contribute in 
most exemplary and useful ways to the analysis of human rights violations. 
Especially in light of the persistence of human rights violations, which are as 
much a global reality as the diffusion of human rights norms (Klug 2005), the 
need to recognize the true and truly valuable potentials of sociology is more 
urgent than ever before. 
Acknowledgement
An earlier version was presented by the first author at the conference on 
“Human Rights and the Social: Making a New Knowledge” at Seoul National 
University, November 2009. We are grateful to the conference organizers and 
participants for their feedback and support. 
References
Blau, Judith, and Alberto Moncada. 2007. “It Ought to Be a Crime: Criminalizing 
Human Rights Violations.” Sociological Forum 22 (3): 364-71.
114 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY, Vol. 40 No. 1, June 2011
Boyle, Elizabeth H. 2002. Female Genital Cutting: Cultural Conflict in the Global 
Community. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Burawoy, Michael. 2006. “Introduction: A Public Sociology for Human Rights.” Pp. 
1-18 in Public Sociologies Reader, edited by Judith Blau and Keri I. Smith. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Connell, Raewyn. 1995. “Sociology and Human Rights.” The Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Sociology 31 (2): 25-29.
Deflem, Mathieu. 2004. “The War in Iraq and the Peace of San Francisco: Breaking 
the Code of Public Sociology.” Pp. 3-5 in Peace, War & Social Conflict, Newsletter 
of the ASA section. November. 
   . 2007. “Public Sociology, Hot Dogs, Apple Pie, and Chevrolet.” The Journal of 
Professional and Public Sociology (inaugural issue). http://www.cas.sc.edu/socy/
faculty/deflem/zpubsocapple.html.  
   . 2008. Sociology of Law: Visions of a Scholarly Discipline. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Durkheim, Emile. (1900) 1922. Leçons de Sociologie: Physique des Mœurs et du Droit. 
Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France. 
Habermas, Jurgen. (1981) 1988. Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, 2 volumes. 
Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 
Hagan, John, and Ron Levi. 2007. “Justiciability as Field Effect: When Sociology 
Meets Human Rights.” Sociological Forum 22 (3): 372-80.
Hagan, John, Heather Schoenfeld, and Alberto Palloni. 2006. “The Science of Human 
Rights, War Crimes, and Humanitarian Emergencies.” Annual Review of 
Sociology 32: 329-49. 
Klug, Heinz. 2005. “Transnational Human Rights: Exploring the Persistence and 
Globalization of Human Rights.” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 1: 
85-103. 
Mills, C. Wright. 1959. The Sociological Imagination. New York: Oxford University.
Morris, Lydia. 2006. “Sociology and Rights: An Emergent Field.” Pp. 1-16 in Rights: 
Sociological Perspectives, edited by Lydia Morris. London: Routledge. 
Sjoberg, Gideon, Elizabeth A. Gill, and Norma Williams. 2001. “A Sociology of 
Human Rights.” Social Problems 48 (1): 11-47.
Somers, Margaret R., and Christopher N. J. Roberts. 2008. “Toward a New Sociology 
of Rights: A Genealogy of ‘Buried Bodies’ of Citizenship and Human Rights.” 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 4: 385-425.
Sumner, William Graham. 1906. Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of 
Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores and Morals. Boston: Ginn. 
Turner, Bryan S. 1993. “Outline of a Theory of Human Rights.” Sociology 27 (3): 489-
512.
   . 2006. Vulnerability and Human Rights. University Park, PA: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press. 
   . 2009. “A Sociology of Citizenship and Human Rights: Does Social Theory 
 The Sociological Discourse on Human Rights 115
Still Exist?” Pp. 177-99 in Interpreting Human Rights: Social Science Perspectives, 
edited by Rhiannon Morgan and Bryan S. Turner. London: Routledge. 
Vaughan, Ted, and Gideon Sjoberg. 1986. “Human Rights Theory and the Classical 
Sociological Tradition.” Pp. 127–41 in Sociological Theory in Transition, edited by 
Mark L. Wardell and Stephen P. Turner. London: Allen and Unwin.
Woodiwiss, Anthony. 2009. “Taking the Sociology of Human Rights Seriously.” Pp. 
104-20 in Interpreting Human Rights: Social Science Perspectives, edited by 
Rhiannon Morgan and Bryan S. Turner. London: Routledge. 
Young, T. R. 1981. “The Sociology of Human Rights.” Humanity & Society 5 (4): 353-
69. 
Mathieu DefleM is Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the 
University of South Carolina. His main areas of research are sociology of law, social 
theory, and comparative-historical sociology. He has published dozens of articles in a 
variety of journals, and is the author of The Policing of Terrorism (Routledge, 2010), 
Sociology of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2008), and Policing World Society 
(Oxford University Press, 2002) as well as editor of six books. Address: Department of 
Sociology, University of South Carolina, 911 Pickens Street, Columbia, SC 29208, 
USA [Email: deflem@sc.edu] 
Stephen ChiCoine is a graduate student in the Department of Sociology at the 
University of South Carolina. He graduated from Lander University in Greenwood, 
South Carolina, with a major in sociology. His main interests include political 
sociology and social movements. Address: Department of Sociology, University of 
South Carolina, 911 Pickens Street, Columbia, SC 29208, USA [Email: chicoins@
email.sc.edu]

